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Slokavårtika—a study
ărila observes that one momentary cognition cannot leave an 'impression' on another momentary cognition (let us call the former cognition 'impression', the latter 'impressed), for two momentary entities coming one after another cannot find time to operate on one another (vv. 181-84). Kumārila's point is that if X is to leave an impression on Y then both X and Y must stay together for several moments (v. 185).
On his part, the idealist argues that if X exists in an identical form for several moments and then produces an 'impression' on Y it is difficult to see why this 'impression was not produced at an earliest moment (vv. 185-86); so his suggestion is that an outgoing momentary cognition similar to the incoming one leaves an impression' on the latter (v. 186). Kumārila's immediate reaction is to repeat his contention that a momentary entity coming after another such entity cannot be acted upon by the former (vv. 187-188). And then he goes on to add that an incoming momentary cogoition cannot be similar to the outgoing such one unless the former shares with the latter some feature or other but that such a sharing of features is impossible on the part of momentary entities passing away without leaving a residue (vv. 189–90); arguing concretely, if cognition-of-elephant comes immediately after cognition-of-cow then being not similar to the former the latter cagnot leave an 'impression on the former with the result that a subsequent cognition-of-cow should be impossible (vv. 190–92). Kumärila further points out that on the idealist position according to which there exist no external objects the rise of a dissimilar cognition should be an impossibility (v. 192). And, granting that the outgoing momentary cognition somehow leaves an 'impression'-or even multiplicity of 'impressions' -on the incoming such one, this impression-or these 'impressions'-should perish along with this latter cognition, so that no subsequent memory should be possible on the baiss thereof (vv. 193-95); on the other hand, to maintain that an impression' lasts even after the cognition in which it was produced perishes will go counter to the basic tenet of momentarism (vv. 19596). Kumārila also rejects the alternative that the series of cognitions and the series of 'impressions' run parallel to each other, for on accepting it it should be impossible to say that a cognition produces an 'impression' or vice versa (vv. 196-97). And since he can envisage no other alternative that might explain why on the idealist position one cognition should differ from another he déclares that the idealist thesis on 'practical reality' (allegedly born of 'impressions' left by past cognitions) is but a brainwave (v. 198). By way of concluding Kumārila remarks that the concept of 'impression. makes sense only on the supposition that the cognizer is an abiding entity that repeatedly undertakes an act of cognition (vv. 199-200).
(iii) Refutation of the Idealist Critique of Perception (Section IV. 1-264)
The entire Section IV is devoted to a refutation of the idealist critique of perception. The occasion for it arises because following Sabara and his early commentators Kumärila has argued that ordinary waking cognition is a case of genuine perception and
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