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Refutation of Idealism
97
in which an illusory cognition is an objectless cogaition; his point is that according to the idealist all cognition must have some object or other of the sort the latter's ontology allows for (v. 56). Then Kumārila raises a formal, and rather trivial, point. For thus elucidated the idealist thesis becomes 'all waking cognition is without an exteraal object', and Kumārila thinks that one who does not believe in the reality of external objects has no right to utter a sentence in which there occurs the phrase 'external object' (vv. 57-59). Viewing the matter from another angle, Kumärila even concedes that cognition does lack an object external to itself, for now he interprets the phrase 'external to itself' as 'utterly dissimilar from itself' and his point is that in so many respects-e. g. respect of being a cognizable entity-a cognition is actually similar to its object (v. 61). And here Kumārila reminds the idealist that even according to the latter a cognition is not utterly dissimilar from its object inasmuch as both are something practically real' (samvịtisatya), his point being that according to the idealist other qua something 'ultimately real' (paramārthasatya) is a cognition devoid of all object (v. 61). Then Kumārila says that in another sense too does a cognition lack an object--viz. in the sense that cognition is not of the same form as its object (it being something inherently formless); however, he repudiates as selfcontradictory the idealist contention that a cognition lacks an object in the sense that what cognizes and what is cognized are one and the same thing (v. 62). Arguing in the same vein Kumārila says that the cognition that all cognition lacks an object is a reality inasmuch as such a cognition is produced on listening to a sentence to that effect, his only point being that such a cognition is false (v. 64). Then repeating an old point in a new context Kumārila argues that the idealist inference should produce cognition to the effect that all cognition lacks an object but that if this inferential cognition is itself objectless then it should be false to say that all cognition lacks an object, his point being that to say that this inferential cogoition is objectless is to say that this cognition teaches a falsity (vv. 65-66). Then proceeding towards a new turning point Kumārila concodes that if by cogni, tion is meant the word 'cognition' then too it is correct to say that a cognition cognizes no object, for certainly the word 'cognition' does not cognize an object (v.67). But he soon adds that if one thereby means that a word is not even an instrument of cognition one would be faced with grave difficulties, for then it should become impossible for one to state any inference whatsoever (v. 68). And it is Kumarila's belief that the idealist really has no right to employ words with a view to conveying a meaning, for at the time of learning the meaning of a word one must have distinct cognition of this word, its meaning, and the relationship between the two-which is an impossibility on accepting the thesis that all cogoition is without an object (v. 69). The idealist might say that while arguing his case he will assume for the time being that words are capable of conveying a meaning; Kumārila retorts that this assumption will stand opposed to what the idealist seeks to prove viz. that
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