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Ślokavartika-a study
which it is posited; his feeling is mistaken inasmuch as the phenomena appearing in a case of implication are as much connected by way of vyapti as are the probans and the probandum appearing in an inference. In any case, it can be seen that in conneetion with his case (vi) Kumārila is considering an altogether different sort of question. For had he adopted here the procedure of the earlier cases his question would have been as to how the knowledge that the fat Devadatta does not eat during daytime necesitates the knowledge that Devadatta eats during night-time? To this question the answer would have been essentially the same as that to the question posed in connection the case (v). For here too there come in picture three possibilities of which two are barred so that the third holds the field; there Devadatta could be lean and thin or he could eat during daytime or he could eat during nightime, but since the first two alternatives are denied the third must be affirmed.
5. Absence (Abhāva)
Absence is the sixth and the last means of vlid cognition posited by Kumarilaallegedly following the tradition of his school. On Kumārila's showing an 'absence' is as much of a real entity as a positive thing; e. g. in case jar exists on a floor the absence of jar' existing on this floor is as much real as the floor and the jar themselves. And it is his understanding that an 'absence cannot be cognized by five means of valid cognition perception, inference etc.; positivly his understanding is that 'absence' is that means of valid cognition which is exclusively competent to cognize an 'absence'. With a view to demonstrating all this Kumaila divides his disc. cussion into three parts viz.
(i) the part arguing that an 'absence' is a real entity (vv. 1-10),
(ii) the part arguing that perception is incompetent to cognize an 'absence" (vv. 11-29),
(iii) the part arguing that inference is incompetent to cognize an 'absence' (vv. 29-55). We consider them one by one.
Kumārila divides 'absence' into four classes (as a matter of fact, one of his arguments is that 'absence' cannot be unreal because it is divided into classes (v. 8). Thus the absence of an effect in its cause (e.g. that of curd in milk) is called prior absnce, the absence of a cause in its effect (e. g. that of milk in curd) posterior absence". the absence of one thing's identity with another (e.g. that of a cow's identity with a horse) 'mutual absence' utter absence of one thing in another (e.g. that of horns on a rabbit's head) 'absolute absence' (vv.2-4). Kumārila's feeling is that unless these so many types of 'absence' are something real curd should be found in milk, milk should be found in curd, a cow should be found identical with a horse, horns
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