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Slokavārtika-a study
the case under consideration it is impossible to find out these three things; various possibillties are bonsidersd and all found wanting (vv. 11-13). Thus the locus and the probandum could be Caitra and a place-outside-house respectively or a place-outside -house and Caitra respectively; the probans could be either Caitra's absence-insidehouse or the house's absence-of-Caitra. But a-place-outside-house cannot be the locus because the probans in neither form can be a feature of it; and the house's absence-of-Caitra cannot be a feature of Caitra even. So the only remaining possibily is that the locus is Caitra, the probandum a place-outside-house (rather presence at a place-outside-house), the probans Caitra's absence-inside-house, and it is interesting to watch how Kumārila rejects this possibility. First of all we are told that in this case the probans cannot be a feature of the locus inasmuch as Caitra's absence-insids --house cannot be observed to be a feature of Caitra (vv. 12-13); the idea seems to be the fantastic idea that if Caitra's absence-inside-house is to be observed as a feature of Caitra then both Caitra's absence-inside-house and Caitra should be observed together. Before coming to this point once more, another difficulty is urged -yiz. that in this case the focus is not a thing observed earlier (v. 16); the idea seems to be the irrelevant idea that Caitra is not being observed for the time being. Then it is argued that Caitra's absence-inside-house cannot act as a probans for Caitra's presence at a place-outside-house, because a living person's absence at a place cannot be ascertained unless his presence at a place-outside-this place is already presumed --80 that since in the case under consideration Caitra's presence at a place-outsidehouse is already presumed there remains nothing to be inferred (vv. 19, 25, 27-28); the argument is simply astounding inasmuch as there is nothiog difficult about ascera taining a living person's absence at a place without already presuming his presence at a place-outside-house. Lastly, it is argued that in the case under consideration it is impossible to establish vyāpti between the probans and the probandum (vv. 34-55). For some reasons Kumärila does not consider the more relevant case of vyapti between absence-at-one-place and presence-at-another-place but the less relevant case of that between presence-at-one-place and absence-at-another-place, but that is not the real difficulty. The real difficulty is about his whole way of looking at the problem, for what he says in this connection amounts to demanding that if one were to establish the vyāpti in question one must be in a position to observa simultaneously each and every place that is there in the world, an obviously impossible demand. Be that as it may, this is how Kumārila argues that on the basis of observing a living person's absence-inside-his-house to posit his presence-outside-house is not a case of inforence but that of implication. It cannot be denied that Kumārila is here drawing our attention to an interesting class of cases where an absolutely valid vyāpti is obtained without much effort, but the fact that this vyāpti is absolutely valid and that it is obtained without much effort misleads him into thinking that what is thus obtained is not a vyāpti but something else. As a matter of fact, in these cases a
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