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this gavaya cannot do so because that does not characterize that cow (v. 44). Kumārila also considers the fantastic possibility that such a probans might be this gavaya (v. 45) or the possession of horns etc. on the part of this gavaya (vv. 47-50). but a really serious consideration he dismisses rather lightly. For the fact of the matter is that X's similarity with Y logically implies Y's similarity with X, so that if the former is percelved the latter is inferred; Kumärila denies this on the ground that this should be possible only in those limited pumber of cause where X and Y happen to have been once perceived jointly (vv. 45-46), but his denial is invalid inasmuch as the implication in question holds good for all values of X and Y. As we shall soon see, Kumārila correctly realized that the cases of implication constitute an important class of logical phenomena (this being the meaning of his positing 'implication as an independent means of valid cognition), but his endeavour to show that those cases have nothing to do with inference always risults in one folly or another.
4. Implication (Arthāpatti)
Implication is the fifth means of valid cognition posited by Kumārila-following the tradition of his school. As a matter of fact, the cases of implication are certain more or less interesting cases of inference but Kumārila has somenow persuaded him self that they are not so and the reasoning adopted by him in this connection throws significant light on how he understands the specific nature of an inferential situation; it is this that makes his treatment of implication worthy of close attention. On Kumārila's showing a case of implication arises when a phenonenon X cognized through one of the six means of valid cognition remains unaccounted for unless another phenomenon Y not cognized otherwise is posited (v. 1); here the cognition of the phenomenon Y thus taking place is said to be a cognition brought about through a new means of valid cognition called implication. To judge from the examples cited by Kumārila implication is mostly employed to posit a capacity (meaning a causal capacity) in a thing acting as a cause. Thus :
(i) on having perceived that fire burns one posits in fire the capacity to burn (v. 3),
(ii) on having inferred that the sun moves one posits in the sun the capacity to move (v. 3),
(iii) on having cognized through analogy that a cow is similar to a gavaya one posits in this cow the capacity to be cognized thus (v. 4),
(iv) on having observed the denoting function of a word one posits in this word a denotative capacity and having thus posited this capacity in this word one positi eternality in this word (v. 5).
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