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Slokavārtika---a study is to be found-so that there can be no instance where this probans is present along with the probandum nor one where it is present in the absence of the probandum (v. 86). By way of elucidation Kumārila remarks that in the case of sadharana a doubt arises because there is caused an understanding that the probandum is prasent and also an understandiing that it is absent while no choice between the two alternatives is possible; on the other hand, in the case of asadharana a doubt arises because there is caused neither an understanding that the probandum is present, nor an understanding that it is absent while it is impossible for the probandum to be present and also absent at one and the same place (vv. 87-89). It can be seen that Kumārila is being unnecessarily prolix while describing simple things. Then Kumārila thinks it necessary to add that the same probans which might be sädhärāna or asādharana in respect of one probandum can well be a valid probans in respect of another; e. g. 'being incorporeal' is a valid probans in respoct of being inactive' and being possessed of smell' a valid probans in respect of being a part of earth' (vv. 89-91). The point hardly needs emphasis. Then Kumārila cites and examines an illustrative case for the subtype viruddhävyabhicărin; the case occurs when air is sought to be proved to be imperceptible on the ground of its being uncoloured and it is sought to be proved to be perceptible on the ground of its being touchable (v. 91-92). We are told that some people regards viruddhay yabhicärin as a new subtype of sandigdha while others say that cach of the two probantia concerned is a case of sādhāraṇa while the two together a case of asddharana (vv. 92-93). Kumāríla thus talks as if one and the same disputant formulates two rival vyāptis but that is an impossible situation. And as for his submission that the probantia concerned are a case of sädhārana when taken separately and a case of asadharana when taken jointly that may be true of his particular illustrative case, but theoretically it is possible for two probantia to be a case of pseudoprobans in all sorts of ways. Lastly, Kumārila makes a general submission to the effect that two probantia which might be a case of sandigdha when taken separately can well be a case of valid probans when taken jointy; e. g. the features being possessed of an upright configuration' and being possessed of a crow' when taken separately do not establish the presence of the feature being a stump of tree' but when taken jointly they well do the same (vv. 94-95). This again is a point that hardly needs emphasis.
Kumārila's account of viruddha is cumbresome in the extreme - So much so that the very essence of the matter is in the danger of being missed altogether. He begins by saying that the viruddha probans contradicts what is intended to be proved explicitly (v. 97). This is an odd way of saying that the viruddha probans has the relation of vyāpti with the absence of the probandum concerned rather than with this probandum itself; and the mention of implicit intention is positively misleading because as a logical category the probans has to be examined only in terms of what it explicitly seeks to do. Then Kumārila speaks of the viruddha probans of as many as six types according as it contradicts a character, a particular aspect of a character,
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