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Slokavārtika-a study
(ii) that the probans must have with it the relation of vyāpti.
Now the common locus of the probans and the probandum is something whose feature the probans is while the probandum is something with which the probaas has the relation of vyāpti, but nothiog apparently fulfils both the conditions in question. Arguing broadly on these very lines Kumārila himself concedes that these two conditions are fulfilled neither by the locus alone nor by the probandum alone nor by the two taken together (v. 30), but he abruptly suggests that they are actually fulfilled by the locus-as-characterized by the-probandun (v. 34). In this connection Kumārila thinks it necessary to argue that the thing-to-be-inferred is the locus-as-characterized by-the probandum rather than the probandum-as-charactrized-by-the-locus (v. 36-38), his contention being that the probans cannot be-at least directly-a feature of the latter as it can be of the former; but when reminded that the probans cannot have-at least directly--the relation of vyāpti with the former as it can have with the latter he simply brushes aside the difficulty (v. 38). Plainly, so far as their capacity to fulfil Kumā. rila's two conditions is concerned both the alternatives here considered by him are deficient, one in ons respect the other in the other. But Kumärila's demand is an impossible demand and his difficulty is rooted in the ambiguity that gradually came to be attached to the word paksa which would sometimes mean the thesis to be proved, sometimes the common locus of the probans and the probandum. Kumārila also argues at length against the position that the thing-to-be-inferred is 'probandum-ascharactized-by-3-locus' (vv. 39-47). In this connection several fantastic meanings are alternately attributed to the phrase "probandum-as-characterized-by-a-locus' and the resultant view criticized (vv. 39-43), but the sensible mcaning the-given-case-ofprobandum-as-characterized-by-the-given-locus is dismissed by saying that the given locus comes to mind even before the given probandum does-so that the former cannot be left in a position subordinate to the latter (vv. 44-47). In fact, the point is not as to what comes to mind first and what next but as to what comes to mind in what capacity —so that if the locus is noticed as loces and the probandum as probandum then it is immaterial as to which of them is noticed first and which next. Lastly, Kumārila considers-in an approving fashion--the position that the thing to be inferred is 'probans as characterized by the probandum (v.48). In this connection he answers the objection that in that case the probans becomes a part and parcel of the thing.. to be in ferred, an undesirable contingency inasmuch as the probans has to be something already established (v. 60). The answer cousists in pointing out that what here constitutes a part of the thing-to be inferred is the given case of probans and not probans as such (v. 51); it is valid but the fact remains that Kumärila's whole treatment of the subject is marred by his unawareness of the ambiguity vitiating the word pakşa: As for Kumārila's treatment of paksa understood as the thesis to be proved through an inference, it is apparently fairly long (vv. 54-75). But in essence he here does just one thing, viz. to emphasize that a thesis to be proved through an
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