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ślokavārtika—a study
the name of offering a corroborative instance of the heterologue type-this becoming specially evident in the case of those extremely artificial pieces of inference (technically called kevalavyatirekin about which it is claimed that they can be buttressed only with the help of a corroborative instance of the heterologue type. All this however is not to deny that the quoting of a corroborative instance (of either type) only too often facilitates the comprehension of a point at issue, a circumstance responsible for the persistence of the practice even after our authors were clearer about the relative logical status of a vyāpti and a corroborative instance.
(iii) The Problem of Pakşadharmatā
In connection with inference the third most important problem after that of vyāpti and that of dsstänta is that of pakşadharmatā. Thus in the inferential proposition "A possesses the feature Y because it possesses the feature X, sinee whatever thing possesses the feature X possesses the feature Y, just like B" the proposition-part "A possesses the feature X” signifies pakşadharmata and difficulties about it arises when one party in debate asserts it while the other denies it. The denial might be made either on the ground that A does not possess X or on the ground that A does not exist at all. All this is discussed by Kumārila while investigating the hetvabhāsa asiddha (vv. 75-82). Thus on his showing the case of A not possessing X is a case of the subtype of asiddha called svarūpāsiddha while the case of A not existing at all a case of the subtype of asiddha called äśrayāsiddha; moreover, both a svarūpasiddha probans and an asrayāsiddha probans might be either definitely known to be such or just suspected to be such. To quote Kumārila's examples, a case of svarūpāsiddha definitely known to be such is 'fire is cold (bence a non-burner)' or
a word is visible (hence transient)' (vv. 76-77); a case of svarūpäsiddha suspected to be such arises when even while doubting whether a spot possesses stoke or vapour one says that spot possesses smoke (and hence fire)' (vv. 78-79). In this connection Kumārila also makes a distinction whose propriety he himself denies later on. Thus he begins by telling us that in a debate a case of asiddha might arise in three ways, viz. when the proposition concerned is invalid (or suspicious) in the eyes of the original disputant, when it is so in the eyes of the rival disputant, when it is so in the eyes of both. The examples quoted above belong to the third variety: an example of svarūpāsiddha in its first two varieties will be found when in a debate where the Mimāmsaka is a party the proposition is made by one party or the other that a word is a produced eatity or that it is a quality (v. 77), an example of asrayasiddha in its first two varieties will be found when in a debate where the Buddhist is a party the pr position is made -- by one party or the other-that a soul is active everywhere (hence ubiquitous) (vv. 80–81). But in the end (vv. 81-83) Kumarila disputes this triple distinction of asiddha on the ground that in a debate what is
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