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Means of Valid Cognition Other Than Verbal Testimony
a thing characterised, a particular aspect of a thing characterised, both a character and the thing charactrised, a particular aspect of a character and one of the thing characterised. The illustrative cases cited in connection with all these types except the first are more or less obscure and the disputant seems to have in mind just one corroborative instance (of the homologue type) with whose help to buttress his vyāpti. This is evident from the procedure adopted by Kumārila in criticizing these illustrative cases; for in each case he just shows that the corroborative instance cited is possessed of the probats along with an absence of the probandum. But a probans can be those proved to belong to the type viruddha only if there are no other corroborative instance (of the homologue type) except the cited one; for otherwise it could well happen that the corroborative instance cited is possessed of the probans along with an absence of the probandum but that there are other instances which are possessed of the probans along with the probandum (while a viruddha probans can have no instance where the probans is present along with the probandum). Be that as it may, in connection with the first type Kumārila's illustrative case is "this thing is eternal, because it is a produced entity'; here no corroborative instance is cited but Kumärila's point is clear--viz. that the feature being a produced entity' is a probans for the feature being not eternal rather than for the feature being eternal' (v. 97). In connection with the second type the illustrative case is the form of a word before its denotation is graped is accompanied by the entity denoted, because it is possessed of a case-ending, just as the form of a word after its denotation is grasped is accompanied by the entity denoted;' Kumārila points out that even after its denotation is grasped the form of a word is not accompanied by the entity denoted (v. 93-100). In conncetion with the third type the illustrative case is samaväva is a category apart from the categories substance etc., because it causes the notion this exists in that", just like contact', Kumārila points out that contact is not a catego apart from substance etc. (it being a member of the category quality) (vy. 10)-2 In connection with the fourth type the illustrative case is 'samavāya is one single entit, because it causes the notion "this exists in that ”just like contact', Kumärila points out that contact is not one single entity (vv. 102-3). In connection with the fifth type the illustrative case is 'soul exists as an eternal entity, because it is an impartite entity, just like sky'; Kumārila says that the probans here is of the viruddha type in the eyes of the Sauträntika Buddhist who does not believe that sky is eternal or that soul exists (vv. 103-4); it is difficult to see how soul's existence is a probandum here and as Kumārila himself will wisely say in another context that the validity or otherwise of a probans has nothing to do with the private beliefs of this person or that - SO that if sky is really eternal even the Sautrantikas should say so and if it is not even others should not say so. In connection with the sixth type the illustrative case is eyes etc. exist for the sake of something else, because they are a composite entity, just like a bedding'; Kuināri!a points out that the disputant being a Sānkhya philosopher must hold that ejes etc. exist for the sake of soul which is something incom
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