________________
Means of Valid Cognition Other Than Verbal Testimony
common seat of colour, sound, touch taste, smell is not in fact one, sometimes by maintaining that the five sense-organs are not in fact different. Kumārila on his part comes out against both these proposed solutions. As against the first he argues : "If a thing ceases to be one simply because its colour and sound are perceived by two different sense-organs then its colour itself should cease to be one because it is perceived by two different eyes. And if it is said that the two eyes are after all eyes, then we would say that the two sense--organs are after all sense.. organs (vv. 156-57)". And the position that the five sense-organs are not different but one he dismisses by pointing out that in that case it should be impossible for one to lack a particular sense-organ while not lacking the rest (v. 163). However, it too is not Kumārila's argument that sense-organs are infinite in number because the sensory features can be graded in infinite ways; for his simple position is that all the sensory features can be classified into five groups that correspond to the five sense-organs (v. 169). Of course, Kumārila also has in mind certain features which are not commonly called sensory features but which on his showing are perceived through sense-organs; keeping this in mind is necessary if we are to follow his following submsssion : "The features existent-ness' and 'qualified-ness' are perceived through all the five sense-organs, the features substance-ness' and 'corporeal-pess' through two (viz. eye and skin) the five features colour etc. through the five senseorgans eye etc. respectively (v. 170)". We thus see that on the question whether the object of sense--perception is one or many Kumārila moves back and forth, but that is something not out of tune with his general position that a thing and the features that charactrise it are neither absolutely one with each other nor absolutely different from one another. However, in the present context Kumārila does not rest content to appeal to this general position but also emphasizes that it is on the basis of 'observing concomitance in presence and concomitance in absence that we have to conclude as to which sense-organ perceives which sensory feature (vv. 168, 161). To quote his examples, on having observed that a deaf person does not hear sound and a non--deaf person does we conclude that ear perceives sound (v. 164), on having observed that one recalls a past experience of colour etc. even when the corresponding sense-organ is absent we conclude that the instrument of memory is manas that is something different from the five sense--organs (v. 162), on having observed that sound is not perceived when ear is absent even while manas is present we conclude that sound is not perceived though manas (v. 164), on having observed that there takes place memory of a past experience of sound we conclude that at the time when ear perceives sound manas too parceives it (v. 166, cf. 160), on having observed that the absence of none of the five sense--organs prevents one from noticing one's psychological states like pleasure, pain etc. we conclude the instrument of perceiving these states is minas that is something different from the five sense--organs (v. 160).
(This entire topic is discussed by Kumarila in the course of his polemic against the Buddhist position on the question of determinate perception, but in view of the
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
