________________
Means of Valid Cognition Other Than Verbal Testimony
jñānam. And yet it is always easy to distiguish from one another a thing, the word denoting this thing, and the cognition of this thing (vv. 182-85).
(2) If a word is identical with the thing it denotes then a word denoting more than one thing should be identical with more than one thing, which is impossible (vv. 186-90).
(3) Different words belong to different grammatical types because they stand for different types of things, but if there exist no things apart from words nothing should distinguish one grammatical type from another, which should make impossible all meaningful employment of words (vv. 191-99).
(4) There are persons who are conversant with a word but not with the corresponding thing, those who are conversant with a thing but not with the corresponding word, those who are conversant with both, those who are conversant with neither, but all this should be impossible if a word is identical with the thing it denotes (vv. 200-4, cf. vv, 220-22).
(5) If a thing is identical with the word denoting it then a thing denoted by more than one word should be identical with more than one word, which is impossible (v. 208)
(6) A thing is superimposed on another either because the two are similar or because they stand close by, but neither relationship is possible between a word and the thing denoted by it (vv. 209-12).
(7) If a word is identical with the thing denoted by it then all determinate perception is false (because) in a piece of determinate perception a thing is cognized as denoted by the corresponding word not as identical with this word, which in turn should mean that all inference is false and so also all verbal testimony (both being dependent on determinate perception) (v. 213).
(8) In the case of a thing (e. g. a new-born child) to which a proper name is assigned before our very eyes we see the thing existing in its own right before even prima facie assertion is made that it is identical with the word de roting it (vv. 223-25).
(2) Inference (Anumāna)
Before examining Kumārila's treatment of inference it is necessary to recall to ourselves as to what constitutes the essence of the inferential process. For that should enable us to judge better as to how far Kumārila has been and how far he has not been able to get at the crux of the matter. To put it symbolically, the inferential process is a piece of cogitation of the form 'A possesses the feature Y because it possesses the feature X, since whatever thing possesses the feature X possesses the feature Y, just like B'. In this connection the most important task is to establish :
Jain Education International
For Private & Personal Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
