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Štokavārtika-a study
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valid for all times to come. Only Kamarila once at least and vaguely at least hinted at the correct position. Thus in the course of his treatment of arthapatti (ArthapattiPariccheda vv. 39-40, 42) Kumārila considers the objection that unless one has observed all the cases of the occurrence of X one cannot say that X is never present in the absence of Y; he answers that the difficulty applies only against that disputant who here says that X is never present in the absence of Y but that he himself only says that X has not been found to be present in the absence of Y. The wording of Kumārila's answer suggestes that he is having a dig at the Buddhist whose position too is open to the present objection, but that is a secondary consideration. For the really noteworthy thing is that Kumārila seems to be thus making out that a vyapti proposed by some party in a debate is valid only in the sense that no party has yet shown it to be invalid. Curiously, the point could occur to Kumārila because of his general thesis on self-validity of all cognition. For this thesis maintains that all cognition is valid unless proved to be invalid and as applied to the case of vyapti it ought to maintain that all vyapti is valid unless proved to be invalid. However, Kumarila himself was not consciously aware of all the implications of his present point and so he too, like his other logician-colleagues, eagerly looked for strategems that should ensure acquisition of an all-time valid vyapti. This becomes further clear as Kumārila's argument proceeds first of all in connection with his consideration of his next question, viz the question as to what begrounds a vyapti.
Kumarila's consideration of the question as to what begrounds a vyapti has deservedly attracted wide attention. For the question is somewhat crucial and Kumārila's consideration of it is somewhat significant. The following is full translation of the two verses that are of cardinal importance:
"In the case of all vyapti that we ever come across some one particular feature acts as its begrounder. As for the presence of what feature necessitates the presence of what feature it has to be determined on the basis of a consideration of the capacity involved. So far as the remaining features are concerned they are merely subservient to the vyapti already begrounded by one particular feature--which is why when one of these features is present even then there is no knowing that the vyapaka concerned will also be present (vv. 13b-15a)".
Kumārila's point is that if the feature X is to act as a probans (vydpya) for the feature Y then the former must be such a one that its presence necessitates the presence of the latter. By way of elucidation it is added that the presence of X necessitates the presence of Y only in case X causes Y (in the language of the Mi namsaka the phrase 'consideration of capacity' is synonymous with the phrase 'causal conideration"). And by way of a logical corollary it is added that if a certain feature is present along with X in this case or that, that would not make this feature. a probans for Y; for the presence of this feature is sheer accidental so far as the causation of Y on the part of X is concerned. Kumārila seeks to corroborate his
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