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Means of Valid Cognition Other Than Verbal Testimony
point with the help of certain illustrations which are all noteworthy. Thus according to him it is fallacious to argue this act is an irreligious act, because it is an act of violence, for an act being irreligious has nothing to do with its being or not being an act of violence--this because the cause of an act being irreligious is its being prohibited by Vedas; it is fallacious to argue, 'this piece of cognition is false, because it is a piece of cognition (or becacuse it is a produced entity)', for a piece of cognition being false has nothing to do with its being or not being a piece of cognition (or its being or not being a produced entity)--this because the cause of a piece of cognition being false is its being found false or its causal aggregate being found defective; it is fallacious to argue 'a Sūdra attains heaven through a sacrifical performance because he is man', for someone attaining heaven through a sacrificial performce has nothing to do with his being or not being man--this because the cause of someone attaining heaven through sacrificial performance is one's being a member of the three upper castes; it is fallacious to argue this thing is perishable, because it is cognised after an effort', for a thing being perishable has nothing to do with its being or not being cognized after an effort ---this because the cause of a thing being perishable is its being a produced entity or its being a composite entity (vv. 17-21). Here in each case Kumärila quotes a feature which according to him is a genuine probans for the probandum concerned and that because it acts as a cause to this probandum; at the same time he quotes a feature which might often be present along with his probans but is not a part and parcel of this probans precisely because it is not always present along with this probans. However, these very illustrations also make it clear as to how difficult-if not actually impossible-it ought to be for one to get at a vyāpti that is valid for all times to come. For example those not sharing Kumārila's religious convictions would find it impossible to concede that that act is alone an irreligious act which is prohibited by Vedas. Another point. It is true that all valid vyāpti ought to be a vyāpti based on causal considerations, but the dictum should not be mechanically interpreted to mean that the probans is always what acts as a cause to the probandum. For example, in that standard illustration of Indian logic smoke is a probans for fire but it does not act as a cause to fire; on the contrary, it is rather fire that acts as a cause to smoke. The exact principle is that the total cause can be a probans for the effect while the effect can be a probans for the total-cause as also for a part-cause and the case of smoke being a probans for fire is a case of the effect being a probans for a part-cause.
These fundamental questions related to the problem of vyāpti Kumārila discusses under this very title, but certain aspects of the same are touched upon while investi. gating the hetvābhāsas sandigdha and viruddha (vv. 83-107); they too deserve examination. Under the title hetvābhāsa or pseudoprobans Indian logicians consider certain cases of inference where the probans appears to be genuine but is not in fact genuine. and our investigation into the nature of pseudo-probans throws light on the nature
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