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Means of Valid Cognition Other Than Verbal Testimony
thing as the relation called class--inclusion spoken of in Western logic, for in Western logic the probans represents that class of things which is either an equivalent class or a sub-class of the class of things represented by the probandum. By way of caution Kumārila remarks that even when two features are equal in extent that one is to be called vyāpya which is actually used as a probans (vv. 7, 9); (the caution is necessary because in such a case either feature is potentially a probans). And issuing another caution he says that if the relation of vyāpti has been established between two features then at the time of employing it in a particular case of infering it must be made sure that t'ie features acting as probans and probandum are precisely the same between which th: relation of vyāpti had been established earlier (vv. 10-11). Kumārila's point is that a feature is always found accompanied by certain accidental sub-features but that the relation of vyāpii obtains between one feature as such and another feature as such and not between them as accompanied by this or that sub-feature of theirs; that is why at the time of making practical application of a relation of vyāpti obtaining between two features the sub-features concerned have to be disregarded scrupulously. The point becomes clearer when Kumārila considers his next question, viz. how is a vyāpti grasped ? For in connection with answering it he submits that the relation of vyāpti obtains between two features taken in their universal aspect, that is, betweca them as they stand when they are divested of all their accideutal particularity (v. 12). By way of exception Kumārila concedes that the relation of vyāpti might possibly obtain between features that are unique in the sense that they are possessed of no accidental sub-fertures (v. 12-13), but the concession is of doubtful validity. To judge from the illustration cited, Kumārila feels that in case the rise of the constellation Rohiņi is infered from the rise of the constellation Kịttikā the features concerned are unique in that the constellations in question are each unique; as a matter of fact, the rise of these constellactions is not smething unique even if they themselves are smetbing unique. Be that as it may, we have now to examine Kumārila's main answer to his question as to how a vyāpti is grasped.
On Kumārila's showing, a vypätiis grasped on the besis of frequent observation (v. 12). Thus when one on several occasions observes that X is accompanied by Y and on no occasion observes that X is not accompanied by Y one feels justified in saying that a relation of vyāpti obtains between X and Y (X being vyāpya and Y yväpaka). However, even if one has not come across a case when X is not accompanied by Y but if there actually are such cases it will be wrong on one's part to say that a relation of vyāpti obtains between X and Y and one will have to admit one's mistake as soon as even one such case is pointed out to one. This is the whole point behind two parties engaging in a debate where one seeks to find fault with the vyåpti proposed by the other, and yet in spite of their so much preoccupation with the problems of debate the point was missed by all the Indian logicians--including Kumārila---who went on talking as if a vyāpti once found to be valid must remain
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