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Slokavārtika--a study
that the acquisition of sentential meaning with the help of the word-meanings con cerned is not a case of inference (v. 232). He feels that in this connection one can possibly propose only two pieces of inference, both invalid. Thus one might say "These word-meanings yield this sentential meaning, because they are these word-meanings', or one might say 'This sentential meaning is yielded by these word-meanings, because they are these word-meanings'; against the first Kumārila objects that the thing acting as probans - viz. these word-meanings - already finds mention in the thesis, against the second that it finds mention not in the subject part of the thesis but in its predicate part (v. 232-34). Both this objections are based on certain obscure formal considerations and are trivial; in any case, both the inferences in question are valid provided it can be shown that there obtains a relation of invariable concomi. tance between the probans and the probondum concerned. So Kumarila next argues - more by implication than in so many words - that no relation of invariable concomitance is known to obtain between sentential meaning and the word-meanings concerned; for if X and Y are to be cognized as possessing a relation of invariable concomitance then they both must be first cognized as such but on the present view sentential meaning is not cognized except with the help of the inferences under consideration (vv. 234-39). Kumārila's point is valid but it only means that if the acquisition of sentential meaning is to involve an inference this inference cannot be of so simple a form as considered by Kumārila. As a matter of fact, a sentence possesses a structure and a content, and on listening to it the hearer says to himself : "This sentence possesses such and such a structure and whatever sentence possesses such a structure yields this type of meaning. Again, this sentence possesses such and such a content, and this content as filling the structure in question makes this sentence yield this particular meaning"; (these steps of reasoning are clearly noticeable in the case of an adult person learning a new language). Be that as it may, Kumārila is of the view that it is in a manner sui generis that a sentence yields cognition concerning something not known before (vv. 240-42). He is ready to concede that a sentence (i.e. non-Vedic sentence) is taken to be true only when the speaker concerned is known to be an authoritative person and also that the hearer concerned resorts to an inference to the effect 'This sentence must be true, because it is uttered by an authoritative person', but his point is that a meaning is yielded by a false sentence ás by a true one and that the yielding of a meaning on the part of a sentence requires no inference of any sort (vv. 242-46). Then Kumārila offers a detailed account of that celebrated theory of bhāvanā (causing) -- by way of describing how the word--meanings manage to bring about sentential meaning; the following are the salient points of his account :
"The verb-word occurring in a sentence expresses-either through its root-part or through the suffix-part, or through both (these being three alternative views)--a 'Causing' which in general stands in need of an objective, an instrument and a
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