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44
(4) Upamana or Analogy (5) Arthapatti or Implication (6) Abhāva or Absence.
And he so conducted his discussion that besides offering a description of these six means of valid cognition he could also define his stand on
Štokavartika--a study
(1) the question as to what constitute the criterion for testing the validity or otherwise of a piece of cognition, and (ii) the question as to what constitutes à means of valid cognition and what constitutes the corresponding valid cognition. So before taking up for consideration Kumārila's treatment of the means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony it will be advisable to first dispose of his treatment of these two questions. We consider them one by one.
Kumārila's discussion of the question of the validity or otherwise of cognition is contained in Codanäsätra (vv. 33--61) and we have already taken summary notice of its net finding; but it deserves a fuller examination. Now the normal understanding ought to be that a piece of cognition is born either as valid or as invalid and that the subseqent application of some criterion enables us to decide whether it is actually valid or invalid. But this manner of puttings would not suit Kumārila who is out to demonstrate that all piece of cognition is born as valid but that the subsequent application of some criterion enables us to decide whether it is not invalid. He also offers two criteria of invalidity by way of maintaining that a piece of cognition is declared to be invalid under two conditions viz.
(i) when it is found to be invalid
(ii) when the causal aggregate that had produced it is found to be defective.
However, to say that a piece of cognition is declared to be invalid in case it is found to be invalid is plainly tautological; so Kumärila is only telling us that a piece of cognition is declared to be invalid in case the causal aggregate that had produced it is found to be defective. But then how can he also tell us that all piece of cognition is born as valid? This latter statement makes sense only in case Kumarila is of the view that no subsequent application of criterion can prove a piece of cognition-born as valid to be invalid, a view actually maintained by the Prabhakarite Mimämsakas. In the technical language of Kumarila, to say that a piece of cognition is born as valid (or invalid) is to say that the validity (or invalidity) of a piece of cognition is intrinsic, while to say that the subsequent application of a criterion proves a piece of cognition to be valid (or invalid) is to say that the validity (or invalidity) of a piece of cognition is extrinsic. Expressed in this technical language Kumarila's view would be that the validity of a piece of cognition is intrinsic, its invalidity extrinsic, a view elaborated in vv. 47-61 and contrasted to three others viz.
(i) that both the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition are intrinsic, (ii) that both the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition are extrinsic,
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