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Ślokavārtika—a study
dity). In Kumārila's mind the two aspects in question are present in a somewhat tangled form. So in his account of the view (iii) the former aspect gains prominence while in his account of his own view the latter. We have seen how the view (iii) should stand when understood as running parallel to Kumārila's view as presented in Slokavārtika; the following is how Kumārila's view should stand when understood as ruaning parallel to the view (iii) as presented in Slokavārtika : "The causal aggregate possessed of a defect produces invalid cognition while the causal aggregate possessed of "absence of a defect" produces valid cognition; but since 'absence of a defect', being a mere 'absence', is automatically available all cognition is intrins cally valid.” Now when it is recalled that causal aggregate possessed of "absence of a defect" can mean nothing but 'properly constituted causal aggregate the net meaning of 'Kumārila's view turns out to be exactly the same as that of the view (iii); it would be that a properly constituted causal aggregate produces valid cognition while a defective causal aggregate produces invalid cognition. There is noihing objectionable about this net meaning, but it runs counter to the central slogan of the view (iii) that all cognition is intrinsicaly invalid as also to the central slogan of Kumārila that all cognition is intrinsically valid. For certainly, if only that piece of cognition is valid which is produced by a properly constituted causal aggregate then not all piece of cognition can be called either intrinsically valid or intrinsically invalld. In this connection something might be said about the view (ii) as well. We have opined that there is nothing objectionable about it, but that is so only when it is examined in terms of the second of the aspects here under consideration. For as expressed in terms of the first aspect it should maintain that the causal aggregate possessed of a special merit produces valid cognition while the causal aggregate possesed of a defect produces invalid cognition, and as thus expressed it is open to the objection that 'causal aggregate possessed of a special merit' can mean nothing but 'properly constituted causal aggregate'. Kumārila's own presentation of the view (ii) is extremely brief but since it was the view actually maintained by the famous Nyāya-Vaiseșika school we can be very certain about its exact import. It is rather the view (iii) as also the view (i) about which we cannot be certain as to who, if anyone ever, maintained it.)
Let us next take up Kumaril's consideration of the question as to what constitutes a means of valid cognition and what constitutes the corresponding valid cognition; (it occurs in Pratyaksasūtra vv. 53-82 and an additional remark follows in Anumanapariccheda vv. 51-53). As was hinted earlier, the oldest authors simply spoke of the types of valid cognition and they would seek to offer a characterization of each of the types posited by them; but the later authors thought it necessary to raise in the case of each type of valid cognition the question as to what here constitutes the means of valid cognition and what the resultant valid cognition---the question of pramānaphalabhava as it was called in Sanskrit, the question of means - and - resultant as we would abbreviate it in English. For example, the author of Nyāyasūtra had declared that perceptual cognition is the type of cognition born of sense-object
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