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50
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Slokavārtika--a study
such and such a characteristic is capable of doing the same. questions, viz.
This raised two
(i) While saying that perceptual cognition possesses such and such a characteristic, was the aphorist offering a full-dedged definition of perception ? If he was, then why is his wording apparently deficient in this respect ? (vv. 1-2, 10)
(ii) Why does the aphorist maintain silence about the remaining means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony which too are after all incapable of yielding information about religious matters ? (vv. 2)
By way of answering these questions Kumärila made two submissions, viz.
(i) that the aphorist did not here intend to offer a full-fledged definition of perception but only to argue that perceptual cognition is incapable of yielding information about religious matters because it possesses such and such a character. istic-to be precisc, because all perception is necessarily sense-porception while religious matters are something supra-sensuous (though with some effort a definition of perception can nevertheless be elicited out of the aphorist's wording) (vv. 21, 38-39),
and (ii) that the aphorist maintained silence about the remaining means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony because it was understood that their very possibility depends on some sort of perception or other--so that if perception fails to yield information about religious matters they must follow suit (v. 22).
It is doubtful if Kumārila correctly fathomed the aphorist's intentions but that is immaterial, for the noteworthy point is that this way of looking at things enabled him to discuss three important questions of Logic, viz.
(i) Why is all perception necessarily senseperception ? (ii) What definition of perception is to be elicited out of the aphorist's wording ?
(iii) In what sence does the very possibility of the remaining means of valid cognition other than verbal testimony depend on perception ?
Kumārila's discussion of all these question is more or less revealing. Thus in his times the belief was widespread that a yogin can perceive even things past and future so much so that it was shared by a large number of logicians even who therefore offered such a definition of perception as should equally apply to the alleged extraordinery perception of a yogin. Kumārila refused to concede that anyone ---even a yogin--can perceive things past and future. True, his ultimate motive was the fear that if a yogin can perceive things past and future, then he can also see what result a priestly performance of yajña is going to bring about at a distant date with the result that all consultation of Vedas for the purpose will be rendered useless. But whatever his motive, Kumārila stuck to the position that all perception
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