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Slokavårtika—a study
that a piece of cognition is itself an 'instrument', its operation as also its 'resultant'; thus a piece of cognition is treated as instrument' when one says that through it the object concerned is apprehended, it is treated as 'operation' when one says that it works by way of apprehending the object concerned, it is treated as “resultant when one says that it is of the form of the apprehension of the object concerned, so that it is a mere manner of speaking whether one calls a piece of cognition an instrument', an 'operation' or a 'resultant'. Some similar ideas were a the back of the Buddhist's mind when he had declared that a piece of cognition is a 'means' insofar as it bears the form of the object concerned while it is a resultant' insofar as it is of the form of the apprehension of this object. Kumārila, of course, did not subscribe to the theory of a piece of cognition bearing the form of the object concerned, but his first criticism against the Buddbist is that he is going counter to the popular usage b' calling one and the same thing a 'means' as well as a 'resultant (v. 74) --- something which, as we just saw, Kumārila has himself done in his own manner. His another point of criticism against the Buddhist is that if bearing the same form as the object concered' be the 'means' and 'self-cogaition' be the 'resultant' then the 'means' and resultant' do not have to do with one and the same thing (v. 79); but this criticism is based on some misunderstanding inasmuch as according to the Buddhist the 'resultant' here is 'apprehension of the object concerned' and not 'self--cognition'. Kumärila's third point of criticism against the Buddhist is that a piece of cogoition is said to bear the same form as the object concered but that in that case this form as borne by this piece of cognition will require another piece of cognition for its own cognition (v. 82); this criticism too seems to be misplaced, for whatever cognizes this piece of cognition will cognize its alleged form as well and since according to the Buddhist a piece of cognition cognizes itself his answer to Kumārila's criticism will be that it will cognize itself along with its form. An essentially similar difficulty Kumārila urges against the idealist version of the thesis of cognition--having-a form (vv. 81-82), but in that case more to the point is his general criticism that in the absence of a physical object nothing can impart form to a piece of cognition (v. 80). As for the Nyāya position on the question which Kumārila quotes with approval, its essential points are verily those that were enumerated by us earlier. Thus he is ready to concede that means' of perceptual cognition could be either the sense-organ, or the sense-object contact, or the sense-- manas contact, or the soul-manas contact, or all the three contacts in question (v. 60); similarly, he declares that indeterminate perception is means' in relation to determinate perception, determinate perception means in relation to the memory of a past experience related to the object concerned and if this memory be ignored then directly in relation to the act now being undertaken in relation to this object (vv. 70-73). Of some interest is Kumärila's answer to the Buddhist's objection that if soul - manas contact be treated as 'means" of perceptual cognition then the 'means' and the 'resultant will not be having to do with one and the same thing; his
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