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Verbal Testimony
than he would require another body to do the controlling and that will lead, to an infinite regress; for certainly a disembodided soul can undertake no function juski as an emancipated soul does not (vv. 77-78). Equally untenable is the doctrine according to which there exists just one soul which gets itself transformed in the form of this world; for this soul is supposed to be free from all blemish while our world is so full of blemishes (v. 82). And if a factor like nescience is posited to account for this anomaly the doctine will no more be a monist doctrine; morever, in that case it will be difficult to see how the sole existing soul should ever be rid of nescience (vv. 84-86). The Sānkhya version of world-creation has its own difficulties. According to it, a soul is inactive while all activity takes place on the part of gunas (= the constituent units of praksti, but such activity cannot take place at the time when there does not yet exist any factor possibly responsible for such activity (all such factors coming into existence as a result of this activity itself) (vv. 87-88). Certain people maintain that karmas - existing-in-the--form - of. potency bring about the activity in question, but that is illogical; certainly, the capacity to produce curd exists in milk but that does not enable milk to produces curd--products (vv. 89.-90). As a matter of fact, if karmas existing in the form of potency really cause the activity in question then it should always be possible for an emancipated soul to become a worldly soul, for karmas so described will rever cease to be there (vv. 91--92). Certain others maintain that activity in question goes on 80 long a soul retains the capacity to be an enjoyer and the praksti the capacity to be the thing enjoyed; but since a soul's capacity in question is its being a conscious entity and the prakyti's capacity in question its being an unconscious entity and since the two capacities as thus understood will never cease to be there the emanci pation of a soul will never come about (vv.99. 100). Similarly, defective is the Sankhya contention that knowledge causes emancipation; true, a karma is caused by nescience but it vanishes not as a result of knowledge but as a result of producing its appropriate fruit (vv. 101-2). Certainly, if emancipation is caused by knowledge then like all caused entities it must be a perishing entity (v.106). As a matter of fact, emancipation is non-perishing because it is of the form of an absence-of-all--karmas, an absence which is brought about as a result of enjoying the fruit of the past karmas and preventing the accumulation of new karmas (vv. 106--12). "
Section-XVII (Sabdanityatadhikarana) In this section Kumārila seeks to clinch finally the problem whether a word* 18C et road or otherwise. It may be divided into four parts as follows:
(isla yy:8-228 there are put four major ontological considerations in supporto the eternality, of a word.
Labas recall that sabda is the generic entity whose two sub-species are varno, hotelty and pucha (=word). Earlier we had left the word 'sabda! untranslated burtin the pursent context we are translating it as 'word'. This will indeed cause some copfosiomibufi will facilitate: English-rendering.
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