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Slokavārtika--a study
note of the fact the Buddhist dismisses a universal as unreal. So he argues that if a universal-and hence an 'exclusion'-is dismissed as unreal then the only real things will be extreme particulars ( v. 35 ) but that since no practical dealing is possible in relation to extreme particulars the Buddhist's doctrine of 'exclusion turns out to be a part of his nihilist campaign (v. 36) And then Kumārila's honest advice to the Buddhist is that he should only say that a universal is a mere mental construct but should not indulge in the misconceived venture of substituting 'exclusion' for universal (v. 37 ). Kumārila further argues that since an 'exclusion' is merely of the form of an absence nothing should distinguish one 'exclusion' from another ( v. 42 ). He refused to concede that one exclusion' can be distinguished from another on the ground that the two have got two different seats; for his point is that the seat of a thing does not affect the nature of this thing (vv. 48-49 ). Nor does he concede that one exclusion' can he distinguished from another on the ground that the two have got two different sets of excluded things; for his point is that these excluded things are foreign to an 'exclusion' and what is foreign to a thing does not affect the nature of this thing ( v. 52 ) Kumārila has also offered a rather ingenious argument to demonstrate that one exclusion' means almost the same thing as another; it runs as follows: “A Cow is what is excluded from non-cows, a horse is what is excluded from non--horses. But the set of objects called non-cow' is virtually the same as the set of objects called "non-horse', the two only differing in that the former includes horses and excludes cows while the latter includes cows and excludes horses. This mean that a non-cow is virtually the same thing as a non-- horse, which in turn means that a cow is virtually the same thing as a horse ( vv.53-57 ). If it be said that the total set of objects called 'non--cow' is different from the total set of objects called 'non-horse', then we woud point out that this totality is something of an enigma. For if it resides separately in the objects in question the exclusions' in question would cease to have one fixed locus each, and it obviously cannot reside in all these objects for the simple reason (among others) that so many of them are yet to come into existence (vv. 58--62)." More seriously, Kumārila argues that to say that a cow is what is excluded from non-cows involves the fallacy. of mutual dependence; for just as a cow is being said to be what is excluded from non--cows, a non-cow will have to be said to be what is excluded from cows (vv. 65-66, 83-84). These are the most formidable difficulties urged by Kumärila against the doctrine of apoha, but his polemic continues. Thus he next offers one set of arguments (vv. 86--114) to demonstrate that on accepting this doctrine word-meaning becomes an impossibility and another set to demonstrate that on accepting it sentential meaning becomes an impossibility (vv.115. 134). Both sets are considerably elaborate but they bring out nothing that is much significant. In the case of the first set Kumārila's central contention is that the knowledge of word-meaning should enable us to deal with the real things of the world but that the relation of an 'exclusion'-which is what a word means according to the
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