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Verbal Testimony
of a thing as the same thing is not false so also is the cognition of identity-of-form in the case of two cows not false. (vv. 48-49). Hence coming back to an earlier point Kumärila remarks that when a universal is thus a matter of plain percoption it is senseless to argue that a universal does not exist over and above the particulars concerned just as a forest does not exist over and above the trees concerned (v. 50). His point is that the percaption of a universal is not a case of pseudo-perception even if the perception of a forest is (v. 53); certainly the falsity of the perception of a' forebt does not render false the perception of a universal, just as it does not render fülse the perception of taste etc. (v. 54). Here is Kumārila's account of how upbike the perception of a universal the perception of a forest is false. "On account of distance acting as a defect there arises the cognition of one forest over and above the trees concerned, but no such defect operates in the case of a universal (v. 55). On approaching close the cognition of oneness in respect of the trees concerned comes to an end; but the cognition of a universal never comes to an end (v. 56). The cognition of oneness in respect of forest which takes place without the employment of words is thus discarded but the same as taking place in connection with the employment of words persists even for a neutral person; however even this latter cognition is fales because it finds no corroboration from perception etc. whereas a universal is cognized in an identical manner by all the means of valid cognition (vv. 57-58). Certainly, a word is properly applied only in the case of things that aro already cognized by other means of valid cognition but as in the case of forest etc. it turns out to be false because not applied to things perceived (reading drue'prayuktasya for drste prayuktas ya) (v. 59). But Kumärila next quotes at length the view of certain other thinkers who treat forest as a real entity; it runs as follows "The cognition of oneness in respect of forest is true even when generated through words
this in spite of its not being corroborated by other means of valid cognition, just as the cognition of taste etc. is true (even in spite of its not being corroborated by other means of valid cognition) (v. 60). Certainly, it is not necessarily required that the cognition generated through words be corroborate by other means of valid cognition (v. 62). However, in the present case even such a corroboration is available; för after-halt a forest is but trees many in number, and they are already cognized by other 'means of valid cognition while the number one is cognized in the case of other objects (v. 63). On their part, certain others maintain that a forest is the universal 'manyness' residing in the trees concerned and this universal is already one (80 'that the cognition of oneness in respect of forest is not false) (v. 66) Nay, we might oven concede that there exists a forest-universal which however lacks single locus, just like a composite-whole (which has got numerous locit in the form of its component parts); true, the locii of the forest-universal are not conjoined to cach other (just as those of a conpysite -whole are), but there is nothing'incongruous about it because it is a matter of plain observation (vv. 66-67). Certainly, the cognition of forestnoss takes place ia relation to all forests (just as .cognition of
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