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Ślokavārtika-a study
seat of a new universal but on account of their sharing the feature 'while being one residing in many' or on account of their performing the common function 'producing the cognition of identity in respect of many' (v. 24), a terminology peculiarly reminiscent of Buddhists who with its aid seek to deny that anything like a universal at all resides in a set of particular objects. Kumārila next submits that a universal is not an ubiquitous entity inasmuch as it resides only in those places where there exists a particular body acting as its seat (v. 25). But he soon goes on to concede that a universal is an ubiquito:s entity which is only made manifest at a place where there exists a body acting as its seat (v. 26). In this connection he considers the objection that there seems to be no reason why a particular object should make manifest just one universal when all the universals are equally present there; his reply amounts to saying that this is so because this is the very nature of things (vv.27-34) Somewhat similar is Kumārika's answer to the objection that if the presence of a common feature in several particular objects necessitates the presence there of a universal then the presence of the common feature 'relatedness to the universal in question should necessitate the presence of another universal in these very objects; for it virtually amounts to saying that the presence of the universal in question is and the presence of 'relatedness to the universal in question' is not a matter of plain observation (vv. 35-40). Kumārila concedes that the particular objects, which share a universal also share a corresponding capacity, but his point is that since this capacity is itself posited on the basis of the observation of this universal it cannot be made the basis for denying the existence of this universal (vv. 41-44). As for the common feature which corresponds to a common udiversal Kumārila first insists that it is quite different from the latter and is just a sign for the presence of the letter (v. 45), but he soon goes on to concede that the two are somehow identical with one another (v. 46-47). Kumārila also considers the view according to which there exists only one grand universal which is made manifest in the form of this universal or that when this particular object or that acts as the manifesting agent (vv.48.50). Against this view his objection is that the alleged manifesting agent, unless possessed of a distinct feature, cannot make possible the manifestation of a distinct universal, but that this distinct feature can only be the possession of the universal in question--so that it is impossble to deny real reality to distinct universals. Kumārila next returns to the point with which he has started his argumentation--viz. to emphasize that a thing exhibits a common feature as well as a peculiar feature while this common feature and this peculiar feature are idential with one another as well as different from one another and both are identical with the thing itself as well as different from it (vv. 51--64). In this connection he considers the objection that it is logically absurd to treat as identical with one another a common feature and a peculiar feature; his reply to it is that identity and differe ace he is speaking of are not absolute identity and absolte difference but partial identy and partial difference (vy.53-55). Here Kumārila incidentally remarks that a common feature belonging
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