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Chapter - 3
Samayusūra endowed with sense-data-called pudgala and prakrti respectively. Both again, recognize and accept the intrinsic purity of the self and its capacity to recover its essential nature. But whereas Sāmkhya system insists on the eternally pure and absolutely immulatable nature of puruṣa, non-absolutist Jains believe in the mutability of the soul. According to Sāmkhya system, prakrti somehow belongs to the purusa who enjoys it though keeping quite unaffected by and aloof from it. In fact, they emphasize that the purusa appears as involved without being really so.' It always remains as it is absolutely immutable. It is the prakrti that knows, thinks and wills and it is again the prakrti that retires to the state of eternal motionlessness. Thus the whole concept is meaningless, because the fact of bondage of the puruşa is not admitted. But the fundamental hypothesis of Sāmkhya system does not warrant the acceptance of bondage for the puruṣa. And consequently, it becomes impossible for the system to account for the constant urge for emancipation and the means prescribed for its fulfilment. Is there any need or justification for earnest straining for the release of the prakrti which is only an unconscious instrument of fulfillment of the interests of purusa? Puruşa is inactive consciousness, intelligizing the praksti, i.e., if the purusa is responsible for anything in the drama, it is this element of intelligizing. Intelligizing, however, does not mean any action or effort on the part of purusa. Moreover, although this puruṣa is of the nature of consciousness, the functions of knowing, thinking and willing do not belong to him. The Sāmkhya system intended to preserve the immutable character of the puruṣa by keeping him free from all functions whatsoever. But it did so at the cost of a number of unsurmountable difficulties. Some of the self-contradictory weak points of Sāņkhya philosophy can be summed up thus : Consciousness does not know the objects, the buddhi is unconscious. Bondage and emancipation do not belong to the puruṣa. How can consciousness (puruṣa) be without knowledge (jñāna) and the knowing buddhi without consciousness? How can the purușa enjoy the prakrti if he is absolutely immutable? The high and lofty philosophy of Sāņkhya, explaining away the difficulties, have little fascination for the Jain philosopher. Ācārya Kundakunda, also takes a dim view of the Sāmkhya philosophy 1. Tasman na bādhyate näpi mucyate näpi samsarati kaścit samsaruti badhyate mucyate ca nänūsrayā prakrtiņ–Sāņkhyakārikā by īśvarakrsna, 62.
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