Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 25

750
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XIX.
The following might be urged "The man does not expound a new meaning through his whim ; he explains that same natural meaning of words which has been there all along. So that your conclusion is clearly contrary to this perceived fact."
If that is so, and if the potency to express well-established things is already there in the Veda by its very nature,-then it should be possible for that meaning of the Veda to be comprehended by that man also who is ignorant of the Conventions.
Says the Opponent "The Veda becomes a means of expressing things only through the help of the Conventions, not independently by itself".
That cannot be right. The Lamp and such things which are by their nature endowed with the potency to illumine things, do not need any Conven. tions. If this were not so, then, through positive and negative concomitance, the potency to express things would have to be attributed to those Conven. tions, not to any natural relationship (between the word and its meaning).
Then again, the comprehension of the meaning may follow from the Veda as helped by Conventions ; even so, the view of the opponent would be defective. This is what is shown by the words -As there is another Convention, etc. etc. '-The Conventions set up by the author of the Nirukta are different from those set up by the Mimāmsaka ; and as there is this other Convention,--this latter could not bring about the comprehension of any meaning Other than that indicated by itself; for the Lamp never illumines what cannot be illuminated by it-such, for instance, as Odour, Taste and so forth,-with the help of Conventions.
Even granting that, on the ground of the other Convention, the Word may be applicable to (and lead to the comprehension of) another thing, no validity could attach to the cognition thus brought about. This is what is meant by the words-Nor can any such potency be recognised'. If, through the speaker's whim, a word be actually applied to another thing (in another sense),then, there would be confusion, and it would not be possible to ascertain the exact expressive Potency of the word ; how then could it be possible to derive from it the cognition of the intended meaning ?
Or, the words of the text may be explained in another way :-The natural expressiveness of the word may be either restricted to one thing, or applied to several things ;-only these two alternative views are possible. If it is restricted to one thing, then the objection (to the Opponent's view) is that-'As there is another Convention, etc. etc.'.-If the second alternative is accepted then-'no such potency can be recognised',-i.e. on account of confusion.
This has been thus declared If words are restricted to one thing, then there could be no comprehension of any other thing (from it); if they are related to several things, then there is possibility of the contradictory things being expressed':-(1504-1507)
Having thus proved that the first definition (provided under 1489) of Verbal Cognition is impossible,--the Author proceeds to sum up his argument