Sambodhi 1977 Vol 06

Author(s): Dalsukh Malvania, H C Bhayani, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 88

T. S. Nandi
,
करुणे दुःखित्वं स्यात् । न च सा प्रतीतिर्युक्ता सीतादेरविभावत्वात् स्वकान्तास्मृत्य संवेदनात् देवतादौ साधारणीकरणायोग्यत्वात, समुद्रोलङ्घनादे: असाधारण्यात् । न च तद्वतो रामस्य स्मृतिः, अनुपलब्धत्वात् । न शब्दानुमानादिभ्यस्तत्प्रतीतौ लोकस्य सरसता युक्ता प्रत्यक्षादिव । नायकयुगलावभासे हि प्रत्युत लज्जाजुगुप्सास्पृहादिस्वोचित चित्तवृत्यन्तरोदयव्यग्रतया का सरसत्वकथापि स्यात् । तन्न प्रतीति: अनुभवस्मृत्यादिरूपा रसस्य युक्ता । उत्पत्तौ अपि तुल्यं एतद् दूषणम् । शक्तिरूपत्वेन पूर्व स्थितस्य पञ्चादभिव्यक्तौ विषयार्जनतारतम्यापत्तिः । स्वगतप रगतत्वादि च पूर्ववद विकल्यम् । तस्मात् काव्ये दोषाभावगुणालङ्का र मयत्वलक्षणेन, नाट्ये चतुर्विधाभिनयरूपेण निविडनिजमोह संकटतानिवारणकारिणा विभावादिसाधारणीकरणात्मना अभिघातो द्वितीयेनांशेन भावकत्व व्यापारेण भाव्यमानो रस अनुभवस्मृत्यादिविलक्षणेन रजस्तमोऽनुवेधवैचित्र्य वलाद् द्रुतिविस्तार विकासात्मना सत्स्वोदेकप्रकाशानन्दमय निजसं विद्विश्रान्तिलक्षणेन परब्रह्मास्वादसविधेन भोगेन परं भुज्यते इति ।" (P. 10 Gnoli)
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( Again, Bhatt Nayaka says: " Rasa is neither perceived, nor produced, nor manifested. For if it were perceived by the spectator as really present in himself, in the pathetic Rasa he would necessarily experience pain. Again such a perception does not stand to reason, because Sita etc., does not play the role of a determinant (as regards the spectator); because no memory of his own beloved one does arise in the spectator's consciousness [while he looks at Sita ]; because [ the representation of ] deities, etc., cannot logically arouse (in the spectator, the state of generalisation (sadharanikarana) [ required for the aesthetic experience ]; because ocean-crossing, etc. [ are extraordinary undertakings, and thus] fall short of generality (sādhāranya). Not it can be said that what occurs is simply the memory of Rama, as endowed of such-and-such quality, in so far as the spectator has had no such previous experience. Moreover, even if it is supposed that he is perceived through verbal testimony, inference, etc., logically there cannot be any occurrence of rasa in the audience-just as it is not aroused by a thing perceived through direct knowledge. For on the appearance of a pair of lovers united together, the mind of anyone present rather becomes the prey of conflicting feelings ( shame, disgust, envy, and so on ); and we surely cannot say that the onlooker in such a scene is in a state of Rasa! If, on the other hand, it is supposed that Rasa is perceived as present in a third party, the spectator should be in a state of indifference. Therefore, it is not possible to suppose that Rasa can be perceived-whether this perception be a form of direct experience or of memory. The same errors may be imputed to the thesis which maintains that Rasa is produced. If it is supposed that Rasa first preexists in a potential form (saktirupatvena) and is later manifested, then the determinants must necessarily illuminate it little by little. Besides, the difficulties already encountered would recur : is Rasa manifested as really present in our own self or third party? Therefore, ( our thesis is as follows ) : Rusa is revealed (bhavyaas present in a