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J. C. Sikdar
The Madhyamika school rejected the reality of the supposed pointinstants of existence i. e, doctrine of momentariness, on the ground of an appeal to common sense and maintained that every separate object and every notion are dialectical, relative and illusive" The Yogacāra school reinstated the doctrine of momentaciness and advocated that consciousness alone is real but is momentary, i, e. the entrance of the doctrine of soul into this school in the form of alaya-vijnana (storehouse of consciousness) through the backdoor. Later on this concept of soul was banished by Dingnaga and Dharmakīrti from the Buddhist kingdom.73
It is noteworthy that the statement "hitassa aññathattam'74 in the Angu. ttara Nikāya implies the suggestion of the admittance of parināminit yata (permanence-in-change) in early Buddhism. According to the Vedānta, as revealed in the Upanişad, the external world is a traasformation of Brahman75 So the idea of conceiving Reality as permaneat-in-change throws light upon the evolutionary aspect of it in this way : "The uuitary Brahman transforms itself into the manifold of the physical and vital universe without losing primordial nature of porfection or fullness":16 It produces the Universe by means of a modification of Itself”.??
The trend of the Indian metaphysical thought shows the evolution of parinamayada of the Samkhya-Yoga system, leading into Kşanikuvada of the Buddhist philosophy and into Māyāvāda (Doctrine of appearance or Illusion) of the Vedāntist Sankara in contrast to the doctrine of Brahmapariņama.
To wind up the discussion, an Identity is essential in the case of all changes, i, e, no relations in time are possible in the absence of a perma. nent entity. The relative permanence is implied by the occurrence of any succosalon as advocated by Jaina philosophy. The doctrine of change (para inamavada) is conceived in this system in this manner that an entity has got two aspects-permanent and changing, static and dynamic, it undergoes change without glying up its essential nature. It seems to be self-contradice tory that some aspects of an entity are static and some are dynamic or changing, for all parts constitute one organic whole. It is explained to remove this self-contradction that the static part of an entity is not really. static, but the entity undergoes homogeneous change with regard to that
72 Buddhist Logic p. 110; See Mädhyamakavrtti of Candrakirti. 547, 73 Ibid., pp. 113-114; See also Trisvabhävanirdesa, p. 2. 74 Anguttra Nikaya I. p. 140. 75 cf. The schools of Bhartrprapanica, Bhāskara, Madhva and Rämānuja in the sequel". 78 Ibopanişad, V. I. 77 "Atmakten pariānāmāt" Brahmasutra, 1.1. 26.
