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Principle of Permanence-in-Change in Jaina Philosophy
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(this is that', in difference to non-occurrence" and in the explanation of
Tadbhavah' given by the auto-commentary of the Tattvārthadhigama Sutra as simply Salo bhāvah'. He explains identity subjectively, so to say, epistemologically on the ground of knowledge of recognition, contrary to the auto-commentary's grammatical objective explanation of the principle of identity as pon-deviation from the siate of being Sat (real), in connection with the expounding of the meaning of the aphorismı 'Tadbhavāuyayan nityan in this manner: "It is that wbich is the cause of recognition The remembrance "This is that only,' is recognition. (This is the same thing I saw yesterday). that does not occur accidentally, that which is the cause of such a statement is Its intrinsic nature (tadbhava). Existing is existence. Tadbhava is its existence, condition or mode,"84
"A thing is seen as having the nature with which it was seen formerly. So it is recognized in the from 'This is that as that (very thing). If it be considered that the old thing has completely disappeared and that an entire. ly new thing has come into existence, there can be no remembrance. And general behaviour or relation based on it would be disturbed. There. fore, the indestructibility of the essential nature of substance is determined as permanence':
In dealing with the suggestion of his predecessor in regard to the point "Tat tu kathañcidyeditavyan", 86 Akalanka explains the contradlotion which may come in the way of the three aspects of Reality, viz, utpäda (origination), vyaya (decay) and dhrauvya (permanence) with the help of the principle of relative points of view of substantiality (drayyarthikanaya) and modification (paryayarthikanaya). As to the point of this contradiction
that which is destroyed is not destroyed, that which is born is not born" (that is, destruction and permanence, and origination and permanence cannot take place simultaneously in an entity) he replies that there may be contradiction, if the conception of permanence (nityata) is made by the view by which decay and origination (vyayodaya) are conceived, e. g. the case of calling a man father and son from one and the same point of view. But here an entity can be called nitya (permanent) and anitya (100-permanent), i.e. subject to origination and decay from the substantial and modal points of
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“Pratyabhijñānahetura | Tadevamiti smaranam pratyabhijnanasi, tadakasmanna bhava riti yo' asya heluh sa tadbhavah / bhavanan bhavah / rasya bhavastadbhavan/" Sary thasiddhi, p. 302. ** Yengtmana pragdr sam vastu tenaivaimana punrapi bhāvar fudevedamiti pratyabhilas. yate yad yat yantanirodho abhinavapradurbhavamaframeva va syat fatah smarananudapatti tadadhino lokasamvyavaharo virudhyate farastadbhavenavyayam tadbhavavyayam nityamiti niścryare" / Sarvárthasiddhi", p. 302, Ibid. .
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