Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology

Author(s): Kokila H Shah
Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

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NYÁYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
Later Nyāya Epistemology
Theory of knowledge in Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāsya.
Vātsyāyana gives analysis of problem of knowledge. According to him, the means of knowledge always refer to an object. The knowledge of the real nature of an object depends upon the following factors :
i. the knower, ii. the means of knowledge, iii. the cognised object, iv. the form of cognition.
While discussing the relative value of the various means of knowledge, direct knowledge is said to be the most convincing of all.
Epistemology of Neo-Nyāya
Neo-Nyāya is primarily an epistemological theory in so far as it confines its discussion to the theory of means of knowledge independent of the objects of knowledge. Gangeśa is recognized as a founder of this school. In the history of Nyāya school, Gangeśa's Tatvacintāmaņi' is the first systematic work discussing theory of knowledge. While dealing with the nature of Pratyaksa, i. e. perception or direct knowledge, he criticises the definition of it as given in old Nyāya sūtras as too wide and also too narrow, because it includes remembrance and excludes some form of perception such as Yogaja one. He simply defines direct knowledge as that which is not produced by any other knowledge. The condition of the contact of an object with the sense-organs had been deleted from the definition of direct knowledge much earlier by Jaina and Buddhist logicians as is correctly observed by Jwālā Prasad2. Later Nyāya logicians seem to agree with this view of direct knowledge.