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OTHER KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE....
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is the result of memory must be regarded as valid as it leads to successful activity. The validity of knowledge by memory cannot be denied simply on the ground that it refers to previously known object.
Even modern western thinkers like Russell recognise memory as an important source of our knowledge concerning past. Russell's view is that "memory resembles perception in point of its immediacy and differs from it in being referred to the past”. However, in Jainism memory is regarded as a kind of mediate knowledge.
Pratyabhijñā
It is translated as conception or recognition which is assimilated knowledge. Its ground is perceptual cognition and remembrance. Jaina view of pratyabhijñā is peculiar. “It consists in sythetic knowledge with regard to characteristics common to the whole species or to essence underlying a number of modes or with regard to other characteristics”.? It, therefore, can be expressed in the judgements of similarity, difference, like This is similar to that, “This is different from that' etc. It arises from observation and recollection. Yet it cannot be included in either of the two but must be recognized as a distinct way of knowing because of its synthesis of pastpresent. These are different forms of pratyabhijñā when we say, e. g. 'This is necessarily that table' it is judgement of identity. When it is said, 'the cow is different from buffalo' it is judgement of dissimilarity.
It is clear that Jaina view differs from that of Nyāya. In Nyāya Pratyabhijñā is classified as a kind of perception and in upamāna only judgements of similarity are included. Nyāya view of comparison is thus, restricted. Jains point out that if
