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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
the criterion of truth viz. correspondence which Jaina philosophers accept, is retained. For Jaina logician, in this way, discovery of truths about changing things is a neverending and yet not a hopeless and fruitless programme”.? The word 'syāt in Syādvāda only indicates limitations inherent in making any proposition. It is not the doctrine of 'may be' or 'perhaps'. When Syādvāda is confused with doubtfulness, probably the critics mistake 'It exists in some context' to mean that “It perhaps exists”. Syādvāda, therefore, does not assert indefiniteness. On the contrary, it is by this method that we come to know certain definite relationship between a thing and its attribute. The position of a subjective relativist or a sceptic is, therefore, different from a Jaina logician. It presents the doctrine of conditional predication and not 'may-be-ism? or perhapsism. 3. It is sometimes objected that Jaina view leads to agnosticism. S. K. Belwalkar says, “The position of Jaina philosophy dealing with knowledge as based on Syādvāda is incorrect and incongruous. 's' can be and 's' cannot be, both can be and cannot be....etc. In this way a negative and agnostic assertion cannot be called a theory”. In the same way, some have also said that it is strange according to Syādvāda to say that a curd and the buffalo are one and the same thing but they eat the curd and do not eat the buffalo. Therefore, Syādvāda is false. Sankara criticizing agnostic and negative attitude of Jainas says, “As thus the means of knowledge, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge, are all alike indefinite how can Tirthankara teach with any claim to authority". But it can be said that Syādvāda never says that knowledge is unattainable. Critics say when Jainas assert two contradictory judgement the question arises whether such a theory at once positive in some sense and
