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CONCLUSION
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object can, therefore, be obtained by systematic interrelations of different aspects or different perspectives' to use Russell's terminology. A physical object thus, comes to be conceived as a 'system of perspectives'. Such a system consists of all possible aspects—not merely perceived aspects but what he calls ‘unperceived perspectives'. Thus, real nature of an object transcends the view of the one who perceives. Its true nature is ascertained in accordance with the different standpoints of the observer, i. e. the naya, to use Jaina terminology.
H. H. Price also supports the above contention when he does not agree with the claims of the naive realists that perception makes no difference to what is perceived and that there is complete unanimity between the sense-data and the object perceived. He seems to support the view that perception of things are determined by many other conditions and, therefore, if we fail to take account of these conditions, our views regarding their nature are likely to be erroneous or partial.
Similarly, relativistic position of A. N. Whitehead and idealistic trends in philosophy of W. James and Schiller support Jaina Anekāntavāds. Whitehead in his epistemological theory takes account of spatio-temporal relations, perceiving mechanism, electrons, protons, etc. in the determination of sense-perception. Jaina Syādvāda may also be interpreted to suggest implicitly the theory of probability in some form.
All these considerations strengthen the Jaina position. Jaina philosophers have committed to the same truths which the contemporary scientific theories of perception and phenomenology advocate regarding the nature of a thing seen and perceived. The manifoldness of reality is a datum. We
