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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
can neither deny it nor can explain it away.
Jaina view has been strongly criticised by different thinkers. In reply to objections against Jaina view it can be said that even western idealists like Hegel and Bradley do not think that any contradiction is involved when qualities of contradictory nature co-exist in a thing. Real is an extramental entity and therefore, can never be devoid of complexity. Although varying attributes belong to reality, they are compatible. Thus, it would be wrong to hold that Jaina Syādvāda stands vitiated by such charges as are laid against it. It does not amount to idealism or scepticism. It is not contradictory to hold that an object possesses different characteristics in different conditions and relations as these characteristics are not incompatible and still in some sense the object remains unaltered though some of its appearances may change. Hence the objections against Syādvāda are not justified.
In the light of foregoing considerations, it will be seen that Jaina and Nyāya epistemology present a significant form of realism. Both Jaina and Nyaya systems are further pluralistic upholding the view of independence as regards the existent real. Both refute the impossibility of knowledge and stand for extramental character of things. Both are, therefore, concerned with the rejection of idealism. Yet, Jaina view regarding knowledge seems to be more acceptable. It avoids the defects of one-sided idealism and extreme form of realism without being slightly inconsistent. In fact, Nyāya epistemology should have reached the same conclusion along with the logical development of realistic principle of knowledge.
Jaina logicians have argued and established a case for
