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NYĀYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
for idealism or scepticism or agnosticism which challenges our claim to knowledge.
Jaina epistemology repeatedly emphasises that object of knowledge is of infinitely complex charactery and can be fully comprehended only in omniscience. Ordinary human beings who perceive through their sense-organs which are but indirect means of knowledge apprehend reality only partially due to limitations of senses. Hence the doctrines of Nayavāda and Syādvāda—the unique instruments of analysis and synthesis
The profound implications of the Jaina theory of Anekāntavāda or ‘multiple truth' as it may be termed lead to the recognition of the fact that it is unreasonable to criticize any philosophical theory from the standpoint of another. We must understand mutually irreducible different points of view of different philosophers. This truth is beautifully recognized by Jaina logicians. The uniqueness of this epistemological contribution must be noted.
In this connection, it may be mentioned that Jaina theory of multiple truth resembles the views of some leading contemporary western thinkers who seem to substantiate the view that no absolute assertion can ever be made about a thing. Bertrand Russell in his book 'knowledge of the external world' gives analysis of the physical object in the light of modern physics. He admits that sense-data are not mere appearances of external objects but they really reveal the extramental objects. Physical objects of external world are not, of course, known directly in single perception. The different sensations we have of them from different points of view or under different consitions give real but partial glimpses of external objects. The true picture of the external
