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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
essences. Jaina realists seem to be perfectly in the right when they strongly criticize Nyāya view by saying that Nyāya universals are unnecessary to explain general cognitions and there cannot be any universal other than similarity. As realists, Jainas admit a basis for general cognition in the outer world but they do not elevate it to the position given by Nyāya view viz. recognition of universal as a separate objective category. Perhaps, it is rightly maintained that "the acceptance of universals as separate entities violates the principle of parsimony embodied in ‘Occam's razor”.S However, existence of universals is logically justified. In accordance with their non-absolutistic standpoint, Jainas maintain that universal is not an identity but similarity which is different in different particulars. Nyāya philosophers posit both universal and particulars as absolutely separate and come to maintain that they are united in the individual abextra. It is clear that Nyāya philosophers can not satisfactorily account for their unity. Jainas rightly point out that two differ not absolutely but only in certain respects. In this sense, the two are different but neither universal nor particular has any reality independent of the other. In our experience universal manifests itself through particular and particular appears as the mode of universal. Thus, apparently inexplicable position of Nyāya finds its solution in Jaina doctrine of universal based on non-absolutism. Nyāya system is right in recognising the reality of universals but extreme realism of Nyāya is indefensible. Jainas, though defend the reality of universals, they are not extreme realists. In Indian philosophy, Jainism and in Greek philosophy Aristotle advocated such a moderate form of realism. It avoids most of the difficulties of extremist theories. Jainas point out that the hypothesis of any other universal than resemblance is not
