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CONCLUSION
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iii. In our perceptual knowledge things are to be cognised as both particular and universal together and neither of them exclusively.
iv. Negation is not different from perception. A real consists of both being and non-being. A perceptual cognition is cognition of both affirmation and negation.
V. As regards the import of words and meaning problem, Jaina theory is a form of objectivism.
vi. Reality is of multiple character. Jaina relativism, in fact, complements its realism and supplies it with logical basis. Relativism of Jainism tends towards objectivism and does not slip into mentalism as relativity has its root in objective universe and is, therefore, not subjective. In spite of its relativistic epistemology, its realistic position is kept quite in tact and it renders Jainism a more consistent and significant form of epistemological realism. It does not end in epistemological anarchism.
vii. Synthetic method of knowledge employed in Jainism amounts to relatedness of things. There is plurality no doubt, but it is not unrelated. It represents a system and yet it is not monistic idealism. The relatedness does not at all belittle the independence of the object.
viii. Jaina concept of extrasensory perception, especially the perfect, infinite knowledge has its basis on realism which leaves no room for scepticism whatsoever.
Thus, Jaina epistemology is remarkable both for its contents and methods. It is significant to note that some twenty-five hundred years ago, Indian-Jaina logicians had propounded the same truth which modern apeculative and scientific thought to-day is slowly coming to realize. Jaina
