Book Title: Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology
Author(s): Kokila H Shah
Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

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Page 217
________________ 200 NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY determine the local sense of a word. But they reject Nyāya theory in spite of admitting that words have conventional power of express their objects, because according to Jainism though knowledge of convention is necessary for understanding the meanings of words, convention does not make its natural power redundant. As regards the problem of referend, Nyāya view is that the referend is the individual participating in the universal, e. g. The word 'cow' means the object 'cow' which is that by virtue of universal 'cowhood' in which it participates. A word denotes the particular, connotes the universal and also indicates shape distinguishing the particular from dissimilar things. All these taken together constitute the meaning of words. Jainism agrees with Nyāya in maintaining the real relation between word and its referend. Words, according to it mean both universal and particular and neither of them alone. A word denotes an object with its positive and negative nature and general and particular characteristics. A word denotes its object and at the same time negates other objects. An object is of multiform character, and a word, therefore, denotes its both positive and negative, general and distinctive characters. This doctrine is in keeping with Jaina theory of Syādvāda. As regards the import of a sentence, Nyāya view is that a sentence signifies the mutual relation of component words which denote objects. Knowledge of the import of a sentence results from knowledge of the words which is the main cause and other conditions like expectancy, compatibility, proximity and knowledge of the intention of the speaker. Thus, Nyāya gives realistic interpretation of a

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