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CONCLUSION
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Perception
The old Nyāya definition of perception as produced by sense-object contact seems to be too narrow as it does not apply to direct perception of a yogin which is undoubtedly a perceptual cognition and yet it is not produced by senseobject contact. Nyāya is, therefore, inconsistent when it recognizes yogaja as a kind of perception. Some Nyāya philosophers seem to have realised this fact and in NeoNyāya, however, perception is recognised as director immediate cognition which more resembles Jaina definition of perception.
There are five kinds of sense-perception arising out of the operation of five sense-organs. We got the similar description of sense-perception in Jainism, the only difference being the sense of sight for Jainas is of fundamentally different nature. According to Nyāya, senseobject contact is a condition of perception but according to Jainas, such a contact is not necessary in the case of visual perception. Nyāya view which emphasises contact of an object as a condition of perception seems to be erroneous to Jainas as according to them, perception of an object is due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant knowledge— obscuring karmas. Jaina view is more in accordance with modern psychology according to which presence of an object and even its contact with the senseorgans may not be effective to produce the experience. Psychological factors of selective attention and removal of psychic impediments are required before we get sense-experience. The later factor may be compared with destruction-cum-subsidence of knowledge. obscuring karma of Jainas. The Jaina emphasis on the fact that perception is not possible merely through sense-organs
