Book Title: Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology
Author(s): Kokila H Shah
Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

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Page 123
________________ 106 NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY conception, i. e. Pratyabhijñā is restricted to the form of upamāna of Nyāya school, then for judgements of dissimilarity etc. you will have to find some other pramāņa. Jainas maintain that negative judgements like “That is not the animal like Cow" etc. cannot be explained by Nyāya view of upamān. Therefore, Jaina philosophers are right in bringing all the forms of knowledge negative or positive involving comparison and synthesis based on memory and observation under the one allinclusive Pratyabhijñā. Jaina concept is much wider as it also includes judgements like "this is longer than that” which are instances of comparison and synthesis. Jainas maintain that our ideas of similarity etc. are real ideas and in the cases where they are found out by comparing the given with the past idea and synthesizing the two, we have conception as a valid means of knowledge. It is neither the form of perception nor the memory alone but the synthesis of the two. Annotations : 1. NS and N. B. 116. S. Chatterjee : The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, p. 299. 2. Chatterjee, S. : The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, p. 305. 3. Pramāṇanayatattvālokālamkāra : Vadi Devasūri : tr. by H. Bhattacharya, p. 175. 4. Pramānanayatattvālokālamkāra : Vadi Devasūri III 7 comn. by H. Bhattacharya, p. 182. 5. Mohanlal Mehta, Jaina Philosophy : p. 156. 6. Russell, Bertrand : Problems of Philosophy, p. 76. 7. H. Bhattacharya, Pramānanayatattvālokālamkāra Vadi Devasūri, III. 15, Tr. and comn. p. 172.

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