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NYĀYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
and particular features though it regards it as a relative one. The class point of view does not signify that Jainas are arguing for the universal as against the particular. It only means that extracting the one is quite meaningful under certain context. Sāmkhya and Advaita Vedānta deny particularities while Nominalistic Buddhism denies universal. Nyāya-Vaiseșika system accepts both but it looks upon the distinction between universal and particular as absolute.
The class point of view is concerned with the classcharacteristics which bind the divergent individual or particular entities of a class. As regards the problem of universals, Jaina position is unique. Jainism believes in resemblance theory of universals propounded by Russell in modern times. Jainas are not conceptualists who believe that universals exist only in mind as concepts. They are neither realists like Naiyāyikās nor nominalists like Buddhists. In Indian philosophy. Jaina view comes close to Madhva's realistic view. Jainas argue that there cannot be universal without a particular. “Universal devoid of particular is like a skyflower, quite a non-entity”? Similarly particular qualities have no existence apart from general qualities. Both are coexistent. But this does not mean that the universal is an unfounded concept. There is synthetic unity among the particulars of a class which cannot be overlooked. Therefore, universal must be given status in the scheme of reality though it is identical with particulars in point of existence. As is said by Nathmal Tatia, “Of course, the absolute identity of the universals in different individuals is not endorsed by the Jaina philosophers. But he does not repudiate the universal as an unfounded concept. The universal is an empirical concept and must be given a status in the scheme of reality. The close resemblance of the individuals of a class is too
