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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
time. Thus, though a thing exists, absolute existence to a thing is denied.
2. Syad nāsti In some respects, everything is non-existent. Just as existence is conditioned, in the same manner nonexistence is also not absolute, e. g. the judgement 'jar does not exist' implies jar does not exist with reference to another substance, place, time and mode. It does not deny the existence of the jar in so far as its specific attributes are concerned. But it denies its existence when other attributes not present in it are considered. So in this predication determinate negation of an object is asserted.
In this connection, the Jaina view of negation may be discussed. The Jainas admit the reality of negation. They maintain that negation like affirmation forms the part of the nature of reality. Each presents before us a new aspect of the object under consideration. A thing has both existential and non-existential aspects and the two are different and real, though connected. Affirmation and negation are not contradictory but complementary. It is important to note that the Jainas as consistent realists put forward the view that negation forms a necessary element in reality. It is significant to note that the Jaina view of negation is distinct from the views of negation put forward by other systems of Indian philosophy. The Samkhya, Vedanta, Cārvāka and Buddhist thinkers deny the reality of non-existence. Nyaya philosophers while admitting that non-existence is real, maintain that it inheres in the thing which is other than that of which existence is affirmed. They fail to see that apparrently contradictory predication may be made about a thing in different contexts. It is not only not impossible but necessary. The word has both affirmative and negative significances each of which is real in its own way. The
