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redundant as it may be objected; because it is statement of consecutive togetherness and, therefore, exhibits a unique feature of reality. 4. Syād avaktavyam : In some respects, a thing is inexpressible. However, the ascription of inexpressibility to the object described is not absolute. Inexpressibility is determined by place, time, mood and nature of the object. Because of the simultaneous presentation of the two aspects, affirmative and negative, the real nature of a thing is inexpressible, i. e. beyond predication in the form of words. This judgement is of great philosophical significance. As A. N. Upadhye states, “In view of complex objectivity, limited knowledge and imperfect speech, the Jaina logic admits situations which cannot be described in terms of plain 'yes' or ‘no'?
It is to be noted that inexpressibility is not from subjective point of view but it has corresponding element in objective reality. As K. C. Bhattāchārya rightly points out, “The inexpressible is object as given : it cannot be said to be not a particular position nor to be non-existent. At the same time, it is not the definite distinction of position and existence, it represents a category by itself. The commonsense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is not expressible by a single positive concept. A truth has to be admitted and it cannot be got rid of even if it is not understood”.
5. Syād asti avaktavya : 'In some respects, everything exists and in some respects everything is inexpressible', e. g. with reference to its own substance etc. a jar is existent and it is inexpressible when existence and non-existence are
