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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
between the two arises. Knowledge is knowledge of the object outside. Nyāya philosophers do not subscribe to the view that essence of a thing lies in its being perceived. Knowledge comes in relation with a real object existing outside knowledge through self-linking relation of subject and object. Nyāya advocates the doctrine of externality of relation and thus, solves the problem of relation between cognizing reality and cognized reality. Nyaya philosophers do not maintain as idealists do, that it is knowledge of ideas which are copies of the objects. In Nyāya epistemology, therefore, knowledge is knowledge of objective reality. But then the question of explaining the distinction between true and false cognition arises. Nyāya realists advocate correspondence theory of truth. It makes the distinction between cognition and objective content of it. In a valid cognition the objective contents exactly correspond to the external realities. In an invalid cognition where error ariseds when we say "This is silver', something else is mistaken for silver and there is no correspondence between the objective content of cognition and external realisties due to wrong correlation.
Nyaya believe in theory of extrinsic invalidity of knowledge. Knowledge is just the manifestation of objects. Invalidity is due to some deficiency in the conditions of knowledge. Neither truth nor falsity in self-evident. Falsity does not belong to knowledge just at the time we have that knowledge. It is known sometime after the knowledge itself has appeared. Knowledge, no doubt, points to a real object beyond itself but this is restricted to indeterminate perception alone. Its data can not be false, for, we are then in direct contact with reality. Therefore, an erroneous indeterminate cognition is contradiction in terms. But error may arise when we try to relate two or more objects given in
