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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
existence of class-essence in the individual objects but they differ from them in admitting the existence of resemblance among them which is regarded as the real universal. Jaina view is not that only individuals are real and there is no similarity among them. But according to them, this similarity is universal and there is nothing like classessence. Universal is not an identity but similarity which is different in different particulars.
The Jaina view is that words mean both universal and particular. A thing is having both general and particular nature. The so-called class-essence which is similarity or universal and particularity are not absolutely opposed to each other. Words have reference to universals but these universals are ultimately inherent only in particular things. Similarly words mean particular but particulars cannot be devoid of universals. Jainas emphatically maintain that it is not necessary to assume the separate existence of universal, because universality consists in similarity. Resemblances and not identities are the basis of class concepts. Jainas can be called, thus, conceptualists in so far as they maintain that universals are not mental constructions and they have existence in individual. They are not over and above particulars. But their conceptualism tending towards realism. There is some objective foundation in things for the class-concept. Thus, Jaina position rather goes beyond realism when it advocates resemblance theory of universal. Jains does not believe in any universal other than similarity and Jaina argument for it is that because it is an object of perception and nothing beyond it is perceived. In other words, Jaina logicians rightly observe that the hypothesis of any other universal than resemblance is not warranted
