Book Title: Nyaya And Jaina Epistemology
Author(s): Kokila H Shah
Publisher: Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre

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Page 166
________________ ANEKĀNTAVĀDA THE THEORY OF MANIFOLDNESS 149 Logically, thus, Jainism develops into the most consistent form of realism in Indian philosophy on the basis of principle of distinction which is inherent in realistic methods. First of all Jainas postulate reality of objective world independent of minds. Then they proceed to show the many-ness in reality. From pluralistic universe they proceed to manifoldness of each such real. “The last step which completes the logical picture of this realistic procedure is an implicit recognition of what may be called, after Kant, the principle of 'Reciprocity or of 'Interaction' or of Community among the reals of the Universe”. 3 Anekāntavāda postulates the relativity of reals. Reality is never absolute but is always dynamic. It has many aspects in accordance with its relationship to other reals. So it implies the principle of interaction, though it is not explicitly stated. Jaina view of universe as interrelated, relativistic system of reals should not be taken to amount to Idealism. Reals are dynamic which mutually influence each other. The logical development of Jaina theory from concept of dualism to manifoldness of reals expresses the consistent theory of knowledge—the significant form of epistemological realism. The non-Jaina epistemological theories which are idealistic are ekāntavāda, e. g. Advaitic monism. This theory is in sharp contrast to Jaina theory of diversified real as it does not admit of distinction in any form. It leads to a kind of mentalism (subjectivism) which asserts the identity of the knower and the known. This is the case with all kinds of idealism according to which there is no independent, nonmental reality. Since they do not admit of objectivity, the principle of distinction has no place in it. The view that there is nothing except mind and their ideas ultimately leads to

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