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THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL
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and is the object of perception. Old Nyāya realists believed that perception of universal is possible by different kinds of sense-contact. While according to later Nyāya logicians, the universal is perceived through a kind of extra ordinary perception of a whole class of objects through the generic property perceived in an object belonging to that particular class.
Universals, in Nyāya, are eternal. They are not destroyed with individuals. Universals have existence outside the mind like other objects. Further, they are given in perception. They are public; their existence is unaffected by observing mind. Similarly, 'universal' plays an important role in 'inference-a source of knowledge in Nyāya. The third source of knowledge-comparison also refers to universal and as regards the import of words also Nyaya believes that words mean 'universal' with particular and form. Nyāya is, thus, radical realism and as uncompromised realists they are committed to prove the existence of the universal. Universal, they maintain, is not merely mental construction of our minds. We simply discover it. It is not invented by us. The Buddhist position that universal is merely phenomenal is refuted. Again, according to Nyāya universal is an eternal reality. Universal has its locus in particular object in the sense that it inheres in it and it is perceived by the senses.
Jaina View of Universals
Jainas, as realists, no doubt, defend the reality of universals; but their concept of universal differs from that of Nyaya. Jaina position as regards universal is neither uncompromising nominalism nor uncompromising realism. Jaina logicians agree with nominalism in denying the
