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THE PROBLEM OF NEGATION
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It is thus clear that according to Jainism that a thing has both the aspects, the aspect of existence and the aspect of non-existence corresponding to the notion of identify and difference. The aspect of negation is not identical with the aspect of affirmation but is complementary to it. Jainas thus do not posit absolute reality to non-existence. Though nonexistence is real, it is not the exclusive character of things. Jainas rightly assert that if reality is considered exclusively of positive character, then on this hypothesis one thing cannot be distinguished from another and diverse aspects of the same thing cannot be explained. Advaita Vedānta, thus, has to explain away the principle of difference. On the contrary, if reality is considered to be exclusively negative, the result is nihilism as is the case with Voidist Buddhism. Hence, we have to admit both the characters of the object. In Jainism, negation is conceived as the idea of difference- the otherness and it has also positive implication. Therefore, negative judgements are significant and not devoid of content.
The problem of cognition of negation is solved by saying that negation as a distinct way of knowing need not be accepted because negation is non-different from perception. Here Jainas agree with Nyāya in maintaining that negation is not a separate source of knowledge, though they differ as regards the detailed account of it. Since reality has both the characters-existence as well as non-existencethere cannot be independent object of negation. "Since reality partakes of the nature of both being and non-being, negation cannot have an object of its own....It is evident that a perceptual cognition determines by way of affirmation and negation, its object in the following way when we say that a jar is not on the ground, we simply mean by it the perception of a surface of the ground and not a perception of the jar.
