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NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
should be noticed that Nyāya view of knowledge is in sharp contrast to the views held by Sāṁkhya or Vedānta according to which knowledge is mofification of buddhi. Knowledge, according to Nyāya does not bring about any new property in the object that is known. Epistemologically, knowledge refers beyond itself to something. Because of this it is distinguished from the other qualities of self like desire, pleasure, etc. As it is aptly put, “Knowledge alone has this self-transcending reference to object and this reference is intrinsic to knowledge as knowledge”.? In Nyāya to be conscious means having knowledge of something. So the term knowledge is used in a wider sense.
Nyāya puts forward the theory of direct realism. Knowledge is the knowledge of an object because it is always directed to an object. Nyāya considers that the objectdirectedness or property of being related to some object is the distinctive character of knowledge. Cognitive act is nothing but the content towards which the act is directed. Nyāya realists believe that knowledge does not generate any feature in the object. To say, e. g. that a knowledge is of a pot is the same as saying that a knowledge content refers beyond itself to a pot. This very content constitutes knowledge.
In Nyāya knowledge is classified into true and false knowledge. The false knowledge is also knowledge because it has ability to manifest. However, true knowledge has certain characteristics by which it is distinguished from false knowledge. It is knowledge of the object as it is. A more precise definition is given by Vācaspati : “It is the knowledge that does not deviate from its object and that is other than memory”.3 It is a kind of right apprehension, an
