________________
108
NYAYA AND JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY
1. Sāmkhya : According to sāṁkhya both validity and invalidity are inherent in knowledge itself and hence are selfevident. 2. Buddhism : Buddhists support the view that invalidity is inherent in all cognitions and, therefore, self-evident in knowledge while validity, if any, is established by something else. 3. Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta : They advocate the view that validity of knowledge is intrinsic while invalidity is due to certain external conditions. 4. Nyāya : According to Nyāya neither validity nor invalidity is self-evident but both are known as well as constituted by extraneous conditions. 5. Jainism : Jainism is generally in favour of extrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge but holds that sometimes, they can be intrinsic also.
It is clear that theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge understands by knowledge, truth. Knowledge cannot be erroneous. It is only pseudo-knowledge which becomes falsified according to this view, then the theory of intrinsic validity becomes superfluous if not refutable. It is difficult to maintain that knowledge as such is true and the criteria cannot any more prove its truth. If what is not true, cannot be said to be known, the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge becomes paradoxical in some sense. The notion of truth would appear trivial on this view and problem of illusory knowledge becomes inexplicable.
Nyāya philosophers, therefore, do not seem to be in favour of the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge. However, there is difference of opinion between the ancient
