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OTHER KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE....
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reduced to any other pramāņa it is required to be classed apart.
Nyāya view of upamāna should not be confused with analogical argument in western logic. In analogy, we infer the resemblance from other resemblance but in upamāna, we infer not the knowledge of resemblance between two things but we have the knowledge of denotation of a word. Knowledge of resemblance is only instrumental in identifying an object.
Thus, in Nyāya upamāna is given a distinct place and is recognised as an independent means of valid knowledge. It will be seen from Nyāya conception of upamāna that Nyāya logicians have cleverly restricted its scope in order to save it from falling into any other pramāņa.
Jainas attempt to reduce upamāna to recognition or pratyabhijñā. Jaina objection to Nyāya view of upamāna is that it is restricted only to the judgement of similarity. The cognition, e. g. This is the object signified by the word gavayā' is a definitive knowledge according to Nyāya which is different from perception and other sources of knowledge. Knowledge leading to definition is upamāna. Jainas point out that the same kind of defining knowledge based on judgements of dissimilarity, e. g. "That is the object signified by the word buffalo', on the basis of judgement 'A buffalow is dissimilar to cow cannot be included in Nyāya view of upamāna which is based on observation of similarity only. Jaina philosophers find this to be illogical. According to them it is unreasonable to exclude the cognition resulting from judgement of dissimilarity from the scope of upamāna. Similarly Naiyāyikās cannot account for the judgement
